This article investigates how the supranational policies of European Union (EU) citizenship were experienced by "third country nationals" living as non-citizen residents in the transnational urban space of Słubice, Poland and Frankfurt(Oder), Germany-two cities separated only by the Polish-German border. With an emphasis on the implementation of the Schengen acquis-the EU's common policies on cooperation in law enforcement, visas, and the management of its borders--this article begins with an examination of the ways in which third country nationals are categorized as a group separate from EU citizens. This article then explores how the everyday presence of the border between Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) excluded third country nationals from the exercise of EU citizenship through practices that placed limits on their freedom of movement. Finally, this article describes how specific individuals responded to these limitations by strategically managing their visa and citizenship statuses.
Schengen's Excluded: Third Country Nationals and EU Citizenship Regimes on the Polish-German Border Introduction "I don't have a visa. . . I dream about going to Germany, but I don't know how." Nadia, a Ukrainian student living in Słubice, Poland, in 2006 was continually reminded of this frustration by the panoramic view of Frankfurt(Oder), Germany, that accompanied her daily walk along the Polish-German border to her university. In contrast to her Polish and German contemporaries, who enjoyed visa-free travel between their countries since 1991, Nadia was unable to obtain a Schengen area visa and had never been permitted to make the five minute trip across the Oder River to visit the German side of the two cities' transnational urban area. Like many citizens of non-European Union states, or "third country nationals," living in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice, Nadia experienced the everyday proximity of the border as a type of social exclusion; a limitation on her freedom of movement that distinguished her as an outsider not only in the cities' locally transnational spaces, but also in the supranational spaces created by the European Union (EU).
Situated about 80 kilometers east of Berlin, Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) share about 90,000 residents, and only became separate cities in the wake of World War II, when the comprehensive Allied negotiations at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences realigned Poland's post-war borders. Słubice was "founded" in 1945 after the new Polish-German border was located at the Oder and Neisse Rivers, placing the eastern district of Frankfurt(Oder), then called Dammvorstadt, inside Poland. Like most towns located in the territories Poland "recovered" from Germany, Słubice's German residents were expelled 1 and replaced primarily by resettled Poles, many of whom had also been compelled to leave Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union in what is today western Ukraine and Belarus. Słubice thus became a relatively small and isolated town located on a highly contested and tightly controlled border which was very difficult, if not impossible, for average border residents to cross in either direction during most of the 45 years between 1946 and 1991.
2 After Poland applied for EU membership in 1994, Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder)'s presumptive location on one of the EU's future internal borders positioned the cities at the center of policymakers' efforts to expand the EU's common market through the elimination of barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital, in an ongoing project of deterritorialization that works against several of the most entrenched functions of state borders. Borders are extremely potent symbols of state power, and are places not only where the practices, techniques, and tactics of Foucaultian governmentality are particularly visible and personally encountered (Foucault 1991:102, cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999) , but also where populations, the "terrain par excellence of
[modern] government," can be delineated, managed and regulated (Miller and Rose 1990 :2, cf. Brubaker 1992 :27-31, Foucault 2007 :105, Inda 2005 . In this regulatory function, state borders act as powerful mediators of identity by separating individuals into different categories (e.g. "national," "alien," "asylum seeker," "legal permanent resident," etc.) based on the relationship between the traveler and the government whose border is being crossed.
Poland's EU accession on May 1, 2004 , and subsequent adoption of the Schengen acquis--the EU's common policies on visas, cooperation in law enforcement, the management of its external borders, and the elimination of its internal borders 3 --was supposed to make border controls between Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) obsolete.
However, because Poland had not fully implemented the acquis's requirements prior to accession, it remained outside of the Schengen area's border-free zone for a little over three-and-a-half more years. For this reason, the border checkpoint on the bridge between the cities stayed anachronistically in place until December 21, 2007 (Council of the European Union 2006b:13), and third country nationals continued to require both Polish and Schengen visas in order to maintain access to both sides of the city-space.
Michel Foucault observes that the effective operation of the apparatuses of security, that is, the mechanisms and calculations modern forms of governmentality use to determine the optimum parameters within which to manage the well-being of a population, both requires and creates freedom of movement, specifically, "the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of people and things" ( :48-49, cf. 6,63, Gordon 1991 . In the course of establishing its common market, the EU has scaled up this concept for use at the transnational level. Indeed, the principle of free movement is one of the most fundamental of the EU's governing values and one of the core rights of EU citizenship (cf. D 'Oliveira 1995 (Brubaker 1992 , Cohen 1999 , Soysal 1994 , Tilly 1996 .
In this article, I utilize the lens of mobility to respond in two ways to Andrew Kipnis's call for increased ethnographic focus on the legal structures of citizenship in order "to lay the basis for the theoretical construction of citizenship as an independent axis for the analysis of both social difference and inequality" (2004:258) . First, I
examine how the techniques and technologies of governmentality (Foucault 1991 (Foucault , 2007 contained within the Schengen acquis's regulations and procedures systematically constitute third country nationals and EU citizens as separate legal categories that are subject to different degrees of mobility, security, and surveillance. Nikolas Rose and
Peter Miller have described these governmental technologies as the "complex of mundane programs, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions" (1992 ( :175, cf. Inda 2005 . In this way, studying the "microphysics of power" (Miller and Rose 1990:8) resulting from the institutionalization of the Schengen acquis at Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder)'s border checkpoint reveals one aspect of an EU-wide enactment of varying and unequal "citizenship regimes" (D. Anderson 1996 , Humphrey 1999 for EU and third country citizens. By subjecting the members of each group to different citizenship practices, these citizenship regimes configure the terms under which individuals have access to, and can make demands for, the entitlements, privileges, and rights of citizenship (D. Anderson 1996 , cf. Wiener 1998 .
Second, I investigate how the presence of a Schengen border between Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) obliged third country nationals to respond to the regulations it imposed either by accepting limits on their freedom of movement, or, more often, by strategically managing their citizenship statuses. By so doing, these individuals exhibited a type of "flexible citizenship," whereby economic calculation becomes "a major element in diasporean subjects' choice of citizenship," as they "both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes" (Ong 1999:112) . In Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), where the local economic space was divided between two national markets, this flexibility was often a matter of financial necessity, and many third country nationals sought EU citizenship through naturalization in Poland or Germany simply as a way to guarantee continuous access to economic opportunities in both cities. 
Codifying Difference
Third country nationals' experience of alienation at the Polish-German border was far from accidental. In fact, the Schengen acquis's border procedures were explicitly intended to have an identity-generating component (Wiener 1998:115,185-186,229) . The process of passing through a Schengen checkpoint is meant to foster a personal identification with EU citizenship as a membership category by promoting a sense of community, solidarity, and fraternity among EU citizens as they are physically separated from non-citizens and subjected to less rigorous levels of surveillance and regulation.
The EU citizen/non-citizen binary is formally codified in the Schengen Common Manual, 16 which mandates different protocols for third country nationals as part of its uniform border procedures. According to the Common Manual (Part 2, Point 1.3.1), only a "minimum check" involving a "rapid and straightforward" verification of the validity of travel documents is necessary for nationals of Schengen member states, while third country nationals require "thorough checks" involving "detailed" verification of travel documents, visas or residence permits, the individual's origin and destination (and supporting documents if necessary), sufficient means of subsistence, and finally, that "the person, his vehicle and the objects he is transporting are not likely to jeopardise public policy, national security or international relations" of the member states.
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Unlike most Schengen border crossings, the Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) checkpoint did not have the requisite separate lanes for member state and third country citizens. 48% of respondents from non-Schengen countries characterized the border as "very strict" or "strict" compared to only 18% from Schengen member countries (primarily Germany) and 11% from Schengen signatory countries (primarily Poland).
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The Power of Stamps
Even for third country nationals who held both Polish and Schengen visas, specific aspects of the Schengen acquis's practices of governmentality, such as variations in the stamping of passports, functioned to limit their cross-border mobility and further structure distinctions between EU citizens and non-citizens. Entry and exit stamps were a ubiquitous part of the Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) border checkpoint, and were a lasting reminder that even as EU citizens are allowed to travel freely with no record of their journeys, the cross-border movements of third country citizens must be documented and After examining my passport and visa, and observing that I should really be making the request on the German side since most of the stamps were from the German authorities, the Komendant asked for my residency registration card (potwierdzenie zameldowania), which I did not have. An uncomfortable moment followed as I attempted to explain why, after living in Słubice for more than six months, I had still not obtained the card without openly admitting that I had simply failed to properly register my residence with the local police. The Komendant apparently decided this was not a major infraction, and after a few more questions, agreed to approve my request. Once my documents were photocopied for their records, I was given two sheets of standard A4
paper bearing my name, citizenship, passport number, the stamp of the Komendant, and an expiration date that corresponded to the last day of my visa. I was instructed to present these papers only on the Polish side of the checkpoint between Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder), and never to present them to the German officials or at any other border checkpoint in Poland, since they could potentially be construed as false documents.
Because they were often unable to follow the exact requirements of Poland's residency registration system, or were disinclined to voluntarily subject themselves to the additional scrutiny and surveillance involved in completing the request, only a handful of third country citizens I met had obtained a letter. Even so, the existence of a local border policy that used of one aspect of the Schengen border regulations to circumvent another less convenient aspect of these same regulations-even if it applied only to the third country citizens that were able to justify their need to frequently cross the borderillustrates the extent to which Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice's border authorities were willing to accommodate the imperatives of the cities' unique transnational space. The next section examines the analogous personal compromises and citizenship strategies many third country nationals were willing to make in order to accommodate the requirements of living along a Schengen border.
Strategies of Citizenship
Within the modern nation-state system, restrictions on personal freedom of movement are inherently linked to the question of "how the economic advantages available in a particular area [are] to be divided up, whether these [involve] access to work or to poor relief" (Torpey 2000:19) . This is also true within the EU's common market, where efforts to enable transnational labor mobility and market access for member state citizens through the expansion EU-level citizenship rights simultaneously necessitated supranational policies to manage the movements of third country nationals (Wiener 1998 , Kostakopoulou 2001 . Indeed, one of the core functions of the Schengen acquis is to push outward the regulatory nexus of market access from the borders of the member states to the external borders of the Schengen area.
Unlike EU citizens, who are allowed--with certain exceptions 25 --free access to all the national labor markets within the EU, third country nationals are limited to the terms of their work and residence permits, which almost always restrict them to work available in their country of residence, and sometimes to a single firm.
For this reason, the question of economic advantage for third country nationals in
Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) usually took the form of how to gain access to the financial opportunities afforded by cross-border travel. All except one of my correspondents moved to Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) either for immediate economic benefit, or for the future advantages provided by the "European" degrees available at the cities' universities.
A third of my correspondents also depended on cross-border access for at least part of their income, despite the tenuousness of their visa situations. Among my correspondents living in Słubice, residence in Poland was viewed both as economic opportunity in its own right and as stepping-stone for gaining access to the Schengen area, and it was generally agreed that receiving a Schengen visa in Poland (with its status as an EU member state and Schengen signatory) was considerably less difficult than in their home countries. This conclusion was supported by considerable anecdotal evidence gleaned from personal experience and from the reports of friends, family, and acquaintances.
Acquiring Polish citizenship was also used as a way not only to guarantee an individual's economic position in Poland, but also to gain access to EU citizenship rights through the automatic conferral of EU citizenship. In keeping with Aihwa Ong's assertion that dynamics of globalization have produced a more flexible approach to citizenship in which economic calculation is a central element, (1999:112) him to purchase used appliances in Germany, which he transported to Ukraine for resale-a grey market activity that enabled him to exploit cross-border price differentials by virtue of his access to Polish, Ukrainian, and EU spaces.
Similarly, Larisa, a Ukrainian IT analyst, chose to live in Słubice as a way to strategically utilize the current Schengen border policies to her maximum benefit.
Słubice's location permitted her to compete for work available on the German side of the border, while still allowing her parents to visit relatively easily from Ukraine. In order to secure both her position in Poland's labor market and her cross-border access to Germany, Larisa entered into a marriage of convenience to obtain Polish citizenship. She found this arrangement preferable to marrying a German citizen and living in Germany, since she believed her parents might have problems getting a Schengen visa in Ukraine.
Each of these narratives demonstrates the importance of acquiring EU citizenship to the full exercise of economic rights within the Union. The rights of labor market access and freedom of movement are fundamentally intertwined within the concept of EU citizenship, and exclusion from one can imply exclusion from the other. In order to function, the EU's transnational labor market requires the right of free movement.
However, because economic self-sufficiency without the aid of social benefits continues to be a de facto requirement for the full exercise of this freedom--particularly with regards to the right of residency --labor market access is essential to assuring mobility (Peebles 1997: 601-604) . Without a legal claim to either of these rights, third country nationals are doubly disqualified, and must appeal to national citizenship policies in order to gain supranational citizenship rights. This dynamic reveals a central tension within EU citizenship. Even as EU citizenship policies and practices challenge its member states' monopoly on the management and regulation of their populations, because national citizenship regulations determine the conditions under which a third country national can obtain EU citizenship, these same transnational policies continue to reinforce national understandings of citizenship identities.
In locations like Poland and Germany, where the concept of nationhood privileges common ethnicity and descent, and citizenship laws are based primarily on jus sanguines, proving a link to the ethnic nation through familial descent, or establishing a familial relationship by marriage to a citizen, is often the fastest and simplest way to achieve citizenship. 26 These links, whether based on an advantage of personal history like Beata or Ivan's demonstrably "Polish" ancestors, or a willingness to enter into a marriage of convenience like Larisa, become a form of social capital that helps determine which third country nationals will have the potential of gaining access to citizenship in an EU member state.
In many cases, this "trading up" of citizenship regimes also implies a loss, as member state regulations frequently require applicants for naturalization to give up their previous citizenship. 27 Anastasiya, a conductor and instructor at Słubice's music school, immigrated to Poland in 1994 and was naturalized six years later. She wanted to maintain dual citizenship, but was required by the Polish authorities to renounce her Ukrainian citizenship. Because Anastasiya regularly crossed the border to participate in collaborative musical projects undertaken by Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder)--many of which were sponsored by EU funds--her continuous need to maintain a Schengen visa made keeping Ukrainian citizenship an impractical option. In effect, the difficulties imposed by the Schengen acquis eventually forced Anastasiya to choose between two exclusive citizenship regimes and compelled her to seek EU citizenship in spite of her professed fear of cultural assimilation and a lack of identification with either Poland or the EU. For Anastasiya, lacking the ability to cross the border presented an economic handicap was simply too costly to bear.
Because of the definitional link between EU citizenship and citizenship in a member state, the EU citizenship model, even with its emphasis on transnational and neoliberal ideas of economic viability (Peebles 1997) , ultimately fails to supersede jus sanguines and jus soli-based models of national citizenship, and despite attempts to imagine the EU as a transnational or supranational community (Shore 2000 cf. B.
Anderson 1983), the legal apparatuses of the member states remain the institutions with which actors "must negotiate in the final instance" within the domain of citizenship (Kastoryano 2003 (Kastoryano :194, 2002 . Étienne Balibar has warned that this tacit incorporation of member states' exclusionary citizenship practices within EU citizenship has the long-term potential of expanding the scope of the discrimination against third country nationals by fostering the development of a sustained system of asymmetric power relations distinguished by the restriction of third country nationals' relative freedom of movement and access to economic spaces (2004:43-44, 121-124) . The power of this discriminatory potential was displayed by my correspondents' great desire to gain EU citizenship and the lengths they would go to attain it. However, as is also demonstrated by my correspondents, for those who have the necessary social capital, the layering of EU citizenship onto national citizenship can provide a way to convert their status from categorical outsiders to citizens. In this way, Vasyl, Beata, Dmytry, Ivan, Larisa, and Anastasiya all made strategic use of the inclusionary aspects of Poland's national citizenship laws as a way to gain citizenship privileges in both national and transnational spaces, including, perhaps most critically, full access to the local crossborder space of Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder).
Conclusions: Schengen's End
In 2007, the Council of the European Union determined that Poland 28 had sufficiently implemented the requirements of the Schengen acquis, and the border controls between Poland and Germany were eliminated at midnight on December 21.
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In Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice, a crowd of around 5000 people gathered on the border bridge to celebrate with music and fireworks, and Frankfurt(Oder)'s mayor rode ceremonially in the last car controlled at the border checkpoint (Märkische Oderzeitung 2007a , 2007b . Only Frankfurt(Oder)'s border guard, which stood to have 800 of its 1600 officials withdrawn from the region, seemed to object to the situation, and a month earlier many of its members had participated in a protest march through Frankfurt (Oder) warning that the Schengen expansion was premature and presented significant security concerns; claims that Germany's interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, flatly denied (Deutsche Welle 2007 , Märkische Oderzeitung 2007a .
While both countries continue to maintain mobile surveillance patrols along the By emphasizing freedom of movement for its citizens while simultaneously limiting resident third country nationals from accessing this freedom, the EU's citizenship regimes underscore the power differential that globalization creates between mobile and non-mobile subjects (Ong 1999:11) . With a conception of citizenship organized around access to economic markets and economic viability, the neoliberal approach taken by EU policy encourages an entrepreneurial and flexible assessment of citizenship (Ong 1996:739) , an approach that was exhibited by many third country nationals in Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder) as they utilized aspects of their personal histories to strategically gain access to EU citizenship through citizenship in a member state.
Two dynamics therefore illustrate the critical differences between the EU citizenship regimes experienced by third country nationals and EU citizens. First, EU citizenship policies segregate EU citizens and non-citizens through practices and regulations that construct EU citizens as freely mobile while simultaneously subjecting third country nationals to surveillance, verification, regulation, and limitation. In Słubice/Frankfurt(Oder), this process strongly divided third country nationals from their Polish and German counterparts by fundamentally altering the way they could experience the cities' spaces. Second, the citizenship regime applied to third country nationals provides them with recourse to fewer transnational rights within the EU, especially with regard to the economic activity and mobility that is so important to the EU's neoliberal conception of the citizen. This distinction represents a type of "status inequality" (Schnapper 1998:117) that is an anathema to the creation of a supranational citizenship community within the EU, but nevertheless threatens to become one of its permanent features.
Notes
1. In total, about 12 million ethnic Germans were expelled from Poland, about 7 million of which were from the recovered territories (deZayas 1979:xxv,58-59,89 Para. 2. 23. On June 25, 1995, these "no entry" stamps were one of the causes behind a public demonstration in Słubice that gained international attention by blocking traffic across the border bridge. The previous day, about 250 Poles from Słubice had gone to Frankfurt(Oder) in response to an advertisement offering DM 100 for a day's work distributing free newspapers. The advertisement was posted at the Słubice town hall and appeared to be legitimate, and most of the people who responded assumed that the company had secured the appropriate work permits. When the perspective employees arrived in Frankfurt(Oder), they were detained by the German border police for working illegally even though they had not yet accepted jobs. Several hours later, the Słubice residents were deported, and "noentry" stamps (officially called "administrative visas") were placed in their passports, barring their entry into Germany for five years. This decision in particular sparked the subsequent public outcry in Słubice, which eventually resulted in the cancellation of most of these stamps provided the affected individuals filed official appeals (Bajak 1995a , 1995b , 1995 , PAP 1995a , 1995b (OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 33 ). This ended a bilateral policy of visa-free travel between the two countries. Ukraine,
